A Henry VIII clause is a provision in an Act of Parliament (primary legislation) that authorizes the Governor in Council (or some other executive authority) to amend or modify the text of that Act by regulation, rather than through the ordinary legislative process.1 The name comes from the English King Henry VIII who had the power to make laws by proclamation under the Proclamation by the Crown Act 1539.
It is now routine for legislatures to delegate certain law-making powers to the executive, typically through regulations issued under an enabling statute. In some cases, this delegated power extends to amending schedules appended to an Act of Parliament (for example, the different schedules or lists of substances regulated by Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19, s 60).
But in some cases, the primary legislation’s language in itself could be changed with a delegated authority instead of by passing a new Act of Parliament. This delegation of power is controversial and could be, as some would argue, unconstitutional.
A Henry VIII clause is in the now functionally inoperative Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, enacted by SC 2018, c 12, s 186. Paragraph 168(3)(a) allows the Governor in Council to enact regulations “adapting or modifying any provision of this Part […]” and s 168(4) provides that the regulations made under this authority prevail over the language of that Part in the Act itself in case of conflict. In References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11, Côté J expressed some reservation regarding this kind of delegation of power.2
While the power in GGPPA seems to be more substantive, this kind of clauses are often used for housekeeping purposes and minor amendments.
In a recent Alberta example, the Information and Privacy Statutes Amendment Act, 2025, SA 2025, c 11, amended both the Access to Information Act and the Protection of Privacy Act to authorize the Lieutenant Governor in Council, “by regulation, [to] amend any Act […]” where such an amendment is considered “necessary” as a consequence of those statutes.3 During the legislative process, the NDP (opposition) sought to remove or limit the scope of this power, but the relevant amendments were voted down by the government. The government defended the clauses as usual practices since the old Freedom of Information and Privacy Act was referenced in so many legislations and regulations that it would be easier to give the government the power to do these minor housekeeping amendments without going through the legislative process. Mr. Glubish, the responsible minister, also indicated a willingness to repeal these provisions in the Fall session if that would please the opposition.4
In the United Kingdom, where Henry VIII clauses raise fewer constitutional concerns, some ministerial powers appear even more extensive. Section 51 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 authorizes a government minister to “amend, repeal, or revoke any existing statutory provision” if they “consider [it] appropriate in consequence of any provision of this Act.” To be fair, the statute also requires that any amendment or repeal of primary legislation be approved by both Houses of Parliament. However, this procedure does not involve the full ordinary legislative process or require royal assent. Amendments to secondary legislation under this provision may be annulled by either House.
Also interesting to read: Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety (Subordinate Legislation Committee), Henry VIII Clauses: Fact Sheet, by Stephen Argument (Legal Adviser) (Canberra: Legislative Assembly for the ACT, November 2011), including excerpts (from page 4) from Lord Judge’s5 speech in 2010 expressing concerns on the resurgence of modern Henry VIII clauses.
Leaving Henry VIII clauses aside, it appears that regulation-making authority in the United Kingdom is subject to considerably greater parliamentary scrutiny than in Canada. Statutory instruments (SIs), the most common form of secondary legislation, are generally subject to either the affirmative procedure or the negative procedure. Under the affirmative procedure, an SI must be expressly approved by Parliament (either both Houses or, in some cases, only the Commons) before coming into force, subject to limited emergency provisions. Under the negative procedure, an SI automatically becomes law unless annulled within a prescribed period, with either House having the power to do so. According to the UK Parliament’s website, “a successful motion to stop the SI is rare. The House of Commons last did this in 1979 and the House of Lords in 2000.”
Federally in Canada, statutory instruments can be revoked by resolution of both houses of the Parliament following some specified procedure (the resolution can only come from the scrutinization committee).6
On another related and more recent front, Carney’s signature Building Canada Act (enacted by SC 2025, c 2, s 4) gives the federal government power to exempt designated major projects of national interest from the application of certain laws and regulations. In the originally proposed text, s 21 of the Act would have permitted the government to exempt a designated project from any federal law or regulation. In the enacted version, a list of “protected” statutes was added, along with a sunset clause that also prevents the government from altering the list of laws subject to exemption while Parliament is not sitting. Here, although the text of the core legislation remain formally unchanged, this broad authority to suspend the operation of other laws also raises concerns on the limit of delegated “rule”-making authority.7 The Act also exempts the designation of projects from the application of the Statutory Instruments Act that provides the procedure of parliamentary scrutiny.
Questions for me later…: (1) Does any province give the legislature any control over secondary legislation? (2) Has any federal regulation been revoked by Parliament in Canada?
- UK Parliament, “Henry VIII clauses”, UK Parliament glossary, https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/henry-viii-clauses/ ↩︎
- Mark L. Aaron, “The Constitutionality of Henry VIII Clauses in Canada: Administrative Law Matters No. 1 — in the References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (2021 SCC 11)” (22 April 2021), Administrative Law Matters, https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2021/04/22/the-constitutionality-of-henry-viii-clauses-in-canada-administrative-law-matter-no-1-in-the-references-re-greenhouse-gas-pollution-pricing-act-2021-scc-11 ↩︎
- Aileen Burke, “Henry VIII Clauses – What They Are and Why They Matter” (9 April 2025), Alberta Counsel News, https://www.albertacounselnews.com/thenews/kfypjpj9lc0eg724k1jx4ti3qxl4iu
↩︎ - “Bill 46, Information and Privacy Statutes Amendment Act, 2025“, Committee of the Whole, Alberta Hansard, 31-1, No 110 (12 May 2025) at 3371 (Hon Nate Glubish) ↩︎
- Yes, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales from 2008 to 2013 was Lord Judge, Judge being the surname of Igor Judge, Lord Judge, Baron Judge. ↩︎
- Statutory Instruments Act, RSC 1985, c S-22, s 19.1 ↩︎
- Dale Smith, “Is Presidential Envy Behind the Renewed Push of Henry VIII Clauses?” CBA National Magazine (21 August 2025), https://www.nationalmagazine.ca/en-ca/articles/law/in-depth/2025/is-presidential-envy-behind-the-renewed-push-of-henry-viii-clauses ↩︎

